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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the improvement patent over the old and expired patent.7 Studies
made by the Temporary National Economic Committee show that this
practice is used for the express purpose of extending the term of the
expired patent.8 An analogous situation arises when a patentee at-
tempts to extend the monopoly of his patent over an unpatented pro-
duct. Such an attempt has been held generally ineffective.9
The primary purpose of patent law is not to create private for-
tunes for the owners of the patents but "to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts."'1  The source of the power to grant
patents and the consideration for granting them are the advantages
which the public will derive from them, especially after the expira-
tion of the patent monopoly, when the discoveries in them become a
part of the public stock of knowledge.11 When, as here, the patentee
has a virtual monopoly of all the machinery for a given purpose12 the
patent, if doubtful, should be declared invalid to protect the public.
PROPERTY
DELIVERY OF DEED AFTER DEATH OF CO-GRANTOR
In 1911, a husband and wife, as grantors, signed and acknowl-
edged warranty deeds to certain lands owned by each. Instead of
being given to an escrow agent as therein provided, the deeds were
placed in a bank lock box. The wife then sold part of her lands and
her husband died in 1915 leaving her as his sole heir at law. In
1934, the wife delivered the deeds to the named grantee. Later, she
died leaving two nephews as her next of kin. They brought this suit
to quiet title to the lands, claiming that the deeds were void at the
time of delivery. Held, the deeds were good conveyances. Miller V.
Miller,-Ind.-, 38 N.E. (2d) 343 (1942).
7. The original patent had expired. Williams Manufacturing Com-
pany v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 316 U.S. 364, 370
(1942).
8. T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 31,160.
9. Infringement suit dismissed because of the patentee's misuse of
the patent by permitting its use only with the unpatented material
sold by the patentee. Morton Salt Company v. G. S. Suppinger
Company, 314 U.S. 488 (1941); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis et al.,
314 U.S. 495 (1941); See also, Ethyl Gasoline Corporation et al.
v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940); Leitch Manufacturing
Company v. Barber Company, 302 U.S. 458, 463 (1938); Carbice
Corporation v. American Patents Corporation, 283 U.S. 27, 31(1931); Motion Pictures Patents Company v. Universal Film Man-
ufacturing Company, 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
10. Motion Picture Patents Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing
Company, 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917); George Kendall, Leander M.
Ware, and George L. Jencks, Plaintiffs in Error v. Joseph S.
Winsor, 21 How. 322, 328 (U.S. 1858).
11. Beidier v. United States, 253 U.S. 447, 453 (1920); Bauer & Cie
v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1912).
12. United Shoe Machinery Corporation et al. v. United States, 258
U.S. 451, 455 (1921). (The United Shoe Machinery Co. occupies
a dominant position in the production of shoe machinery and sup-
plies a very large percentage of such machinery used by manu-
facturers.)
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The court held that while the deeds express the intent to deliver
to an escrow agent to hold until the deaths of the grantors, no con-
sideration can be given thereto other than to say that these statements
are mere surplusage and cannot nullify the clear purpose of the wife
at the time the deeds were delivered. Light v. Lane, 41 Ind. 539 (1873).
A deed is consummated by the delivery by the grantor and its accept-
ance by the grantee. Harwood v. Masquelette, 95 Ind. App. 338, 181
N.E. 380 (1932); Cassidy v. Ward, 70 Ind. App. 550, 123 N.E. 724
(1919); Sims v. Smith, 99 Ind. 469 (1884). Until delivery these deeds
were merely inoperative scraps of paper. 16 AM. J-OR., DEEDS, § 23, at 450.
Being neither void nor voidable there is no question of ratification or
disaffirmance. It is immaterial how she originally signed, whether
as grantor or releasor, as a married or unmarried woman. At the
time of delivery her former signature was adopted by her as an un-
married woman and as a grantor for the purpose of conveyance.
Sims v. Smith, 99 Ind. 469 (1884); Nye v. Lowry, 82 Ind. 316 (1882).
The date of delivery is the date at which the legal status of the grantor
is to be determined. Harwood v. Masquelette, 95 Ind. App. 338, 181
N.E. 380 (1932); and a deed signed when under a disability is good
if delivered after the disability is removed, the date of delivery being
the date of the transaction. Tested by these rules it is apparent that
the sale of a part of the land between the time the deeds were written
and the time of their delivery by the wife did not destroy the effi-
cacy of the deeds, and the fact that the deeds at delivery included
more real estate than then owned by the grantor did not destroy the
operative effect of the deeds as to the lands owned by the grantor.
16 AM. JUR., DEEDS, §329, at 623.
The decision herein conforms with previous Indiana cases and
is in line with decisions of other jurisdictions on similar facts. Saun-
ders v. Blythe, 112 Mo. 1, 20 S.W. 31R (1892); Doe v. Howland, 8 Cow.
277 (N.Y. 1828); Goodman v. Goodman, 20 Ohio App. 419, 152 N.E.
200 (1926); Jourdan v. Jourdan, 9 S. & R. 268 (Pa. 1823).
TORTS
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
Plaintiff's intestate was killed while climbing an unguarded high
tension electrical tower located 1000 feet from a traveled road. Chil-
dren were accustomed to playing in that vicinity, and the jury found
that the child had been actually attracted to the tower. Held, for
plaintiff. Electrical tower was an attractive nuisance. Gillespie v.
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 43 N.E. (2d) 141 (Ill. 1942).
The court in the instant case applied the rule of United Zink Co.,
v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922), which held that for recovery the instru-
mentality must in fact attract the victim on to the premises.
Some authorities have criticised this rule, contending that if for
any reason the occupier of the land knew that children were likely
to trespass and become exposed to a dangerous and attractive device,
then the duty to protect the children arises. Recovery should be
allowed even though the children were not in fact attracted on to the
